A NEW DEFINITION OF KNOWLEDGE FROM THE LENS OF ARGUMENT FROM HYPOTHESIS IN THE *PHAEDO*

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Abstract

The searching for an acceptable knowledge definition appears to have reached its climax in Plato's Theaetetus. In spite of reaching this climax, it also appears that there seems not to be insight as the search has been jettisoned, thereby making scholars re-focus on their preoccupation concerning discourse and pursuit about knowledge definition. One of the implications, if carefully looked at, is a serious and deliberate diversion, although with intent, into considering knowledge claims and justification for such claims dominating epistemological discourse of today. Search for, and eventual proposing, an acceptable knowledge definition, which has apparently been abandoned, is the thrust of this paper. While the paper recognises the futile efforts of the interlocutors at getting an acceptable knowledge definition in Theaetetus, it proposes and shows further that a possible knowledge definition devoid of the defects encountered in Theaetetus is possible. It concludes that this can be achieved with recourse to another dialogue of Plato, Phaedo, where the required tool to achieving the targeted goal is possible.

Keywords: *Theaetetus*, knowledge definition, Argument from Hypothesis

Introduction

In historical discourse, there exists a disappointing outcome of the intellectual journey of interlocutors, especially Theaetetus and Socrates, in attempts to give a definition of knowledge that would be universally acceptable. This intellectual journey is characterised with a rigorous but 'fruitless' engagement as all attempted efforts could not quench the thirsty aspiration of those desiring the possible outcome of the engagement. An all-important phenomenon, such as knowledge, is not something to be ignored. There should be a continuous effort to proffer solution to such demand.

This paper tries to make a case for a proposed definition of knowledge that is considered to be a succour to the yet to be solved, but seemingly ignored, traditional definition of knowledge as emanated from Plato's *Theaetetus*. It equally places the new definition on the pedestal of the criteria agreed upon by the interlocutors as discussed in *Theaetetus*. The paper argues, using the methods of textual interpretation, conventional philosophical argumentation and conceptual clarification, that this new definition satisfies the criteria. It equally considers the implication of this new definition on JTB in the sense

that JTB is an indirect replica of the discussions about knowledge definitions in *the Theaetetus*.

The Initial Attempts in Perspective

The starting point for the definition of knowledge in *the Theaetetus* is agreeing on the kind of definition of knowledge they both would prefer. In other words, the standard for such definition is set. For there to be an acceptable definition of knowledge, two basic criteria (guidelines/rules for the interlocutors) must be met. One, knowledge must be 'what is'. Two, knowledge must be infallible (unerring).[200] By what is, it means that any definition to be given must not be spacio-temporally conditioned.

Describing the above, a foundationalist reading is necessary. The reading is expected not to be the one that will suffer the same and common defect that modern epistemologists ascribe to foundationalism. Here, the self-evident, self-sufficient basic belief has been provided. William P. Alston has described foundationalism as a theory with "relevant rules, regulations, laws, obligations, duties … permitted by relevant system of principles."[201] Borrowing this idea, and given its relevance, it is observed that the criteria are a relevant system of principles, agreed upon by the interlocutors. By so doing, the criteria become guiding laws and regulations. This is to be considered as 'given'. The given, now 'what is' and infallibility (unerroneous), is to justify the definitions. Any suggested definition tested (justified) by each of the components ('what is' and 'infallibility') and it meets one of the criteria but fails to meet the other, becomes unacceptable. Hence, meeting the two criteria is a requirement.[202] This serves as what contemporary epistemologists regard as basic beliefs.

Non-basic beliefs are suggested definitions that have to be justified. This further establishes the connection between the criteria as self-evident, self-justified beliefs and the suggested definitions as non-basic beliefs.[203] Three definitions are suggested; they are 'knowledge is perception',[204] 'knowledge is true judgement/belief'[205] and 'knowledge is true belief with an account'.[206]

Socrates has shown reasons why 'knowledge is nothing but perception'[207] is not acceptable as a definition of knowledge, one of which is the fact that it is not supported by the agreed upon criteria that knowledge should be – what is,

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[200.] Plato, *Theaetetus*, 152c
[201.] William P. Alston, "The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification," *Philosophical Perspectives*, 2, Epistemology, 1988: 257
[202.] This is the logical foundational interpretation of the rule. See John Turri, "Foundationalism for Modest Infinitists" *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 40 (2), June, 2010: 276.
[203.] See Peter J. Graham, "Does Justification Aim at Truth?" *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 41 (1), March, 2011: 52
[204.] Plato, *Theaetetus*, 151d-e
[205.] Plato, *Theaetetus*, 187a
[206.] Plato, *Theaetetus*, 201d
[207.] Plato, *Theaetetus*, 151e

and it must be infallible. In addition, and very importantly, given the characteristics of perception, its relativity and constant change, it does not satisfy the first component of the conjunct. By virtue of this, whatsoever that cannot be categorised as what is, or borrowing from Parmenides *ESTI* (IT IS), such is said to be contingent. Since contingency is not a characteristic of knowledge, it, therefore, means that 'knowledge is perception' is not an acceptable definition of knowledge. Since the definition has failed on the basis of the first component of the said conjunct, it means that it is not tenable.

The second definition, 'knowledge is true belief',[208] is suggested, apparently, to take care of the deficiencies of the first definition. This definition is to be considered on two grounds. One, and the fundamental, is the conditions agreed upon by the interlocutors. Two, it is to be looked at from the perspective of something better than perception. Despite the fact that this other definition appears to be better than the first one, it is not without its challenges. One of such is that it relies on the same pedestal as the rejected first definition. For instance, it is dependent on testimony. Testimony is usually a product of sense experience. It is an attempt to reproduce some elements of knowledge that have been previously witnessed.[209] This is with the help of retained factual memory, the actual memory given prominence by epistemologists.[210]

'Judgement/Belief' involved in the second definition is the summation of the perceptual activities as witnessed by the agent who gives the testimony. Since whatsoever the Jury is told, it acts upon, it means the Jury relies on the testimony given by the witness. The testimony is unreliable as it is equally a product of perceptual activities which have been declared fallible because of its unceasing changing (unstable) nature.[211] This means the second definition falls short of the conditions to be met before an acceptable definition of knowledge can be given.

The third definition is true belief with an account.[212] This definition appears more promising than the two earlier discussed. While it is considered that *logos*, a phenomenon that is not of the sensible world, has been added. Its addition is expected to assist in arriving at an acceptable definition. *Logos* (account) creates more problem than envisaged; the ambiguous nature of 'account' makes it not 'what is' and fallible. The inability to situate the concept 'account properly' leads to the unacceptability of the third definition. The *logos* mentioned and discussed in the *Theaetetus* is that of analysis.

[208.] Plato, *Theaetetus*, 187a
[209.] Peter King and Nathan Ballantyne, "Augustine on Testimony" *Canadian Journal of Philosophy,* 39 (2), June 2009: 197
[210.] See Don Locke, *Memory*, London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1971
[211.] This is in line with Heraclitus' constant flux dictum which has been used to refute the first suggested definition.
[212.] Plato, *Theaetetus*, 201d

The third definition is considered to be a beneficiary of the two worlds, given the analysis. One is in true belief (a beneficiary of the sensible world), and the other is in *logos*, a product of the Forms. The *logos*, in the analysis, is that of analysis that cannot question itself. In other words, it will be unable to proceed beyond the stage of that analysis. Its inability to question itself leads to its not being able to be justified by the two basic conditions set. This means it cannot be 'what is'. In addition, it will be fallible since it cannot proceed beyond its current stage. It means it cannot meet relevant objections which will make it stronger.

In summary, the three definitions suggested are rejected because of the fact that none pass the justificatory conditions agreed upon by the interlocutors. One obvious reason is that each of the definitions is a beneficiary of perceptual activities of the sensible world, which can never meet the criteria of 'what is' and infallibility. As shown by Plato, Protagoras' and Heraclitus' dicta are enough to prove this. Both dicta invalidate the possibility of perception as knowledge, which invariably disqualifies 'knowledge is perception' as an acceptable definition of knowledge.[213] This has led to some scholars to opine that the essence of *Theaetetus* is to deny the possibility of knowledge, because it ends in an *aporia*.[214] This is a total misinterpretation on the part of Zucchetti as that is not the theme of *Theaetetus*. What Plato has done is to make abundant clarification that acceptable knowledge is not obtainable in the sensible world. In other words, the theme of *Theaetetus* is not to deny the possibility of knowledge. It is to show that acceptable definition of knowledge is not obtainable in the sensible world.

Ascension of the Mind from *Dianoia* to *Noesis*
Dianoia, the third stage, is where philosophic mind relapses once more, having done so at earlier stages of the sensible world. It relapses because of its affiliation with some of the objects of the sensible world. Its target is to have a pure contemplative knowledge that is devoid of fallible perceptions and objects of such perceptions, which are distractions. The philosophic mind can best reflect if and only if "it is free of all distractions".[215] Having pure knowledge requires focusing on the way to get the reality. Hence, it requires necessarily that it gets rid of these distractions. This is because its attainment of truth is not by the help of the body, for mind is led astray if it relies on the body for assistance of any kind.[216] It despises bodily and worldly pleasure and look beyond the deceitful witness of the senses and the distraction of emotions.

[213.] Plato, *Theaetetus*, 182c
[214.] Nicholas Zucchetti, "Trabattoni's Interpretation of Plato's Epistemology", *Essays on Plato's Epistemology*, Ancient and Medieval Philosophy Series 1, 5, Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2016, 104
[215.] Plato, *Phaedo*, 65b
[216.] Plato, *Phaedo*, 65b

It needs to ascend to *noesis*, which is the last stage. It appears impossible because the mind is hindered by some sensible affiliations. It must, as a matter of necessity, move beyond *dianoia*, for it to accomplish its targeted mission. It is at this stage that what I shall refer to as philosophic pretention is deployed. Here, this means that the mind assumes that some things do not matter while pursuing knowledge.

The philosophic mind tries to free itself. Its freedom from all distractions enables it ignores the body and becomes "as far as possible independent." It tries to avoid all physical contacts as much as it can, in its search for reality,[217] for it to achieve its purpose. If the philosophic mind is ever to have pure knowledge of anything, it must get rid of the body and contemplate things. Avoiding distraction is a factor for the mind to ascend to where it can get pure and contemplative knowledge. This is what is described by Plato as 'philosopher's practice of death'.

In *Phaedo*, this practice is an analogy of the above description. The philosopher tries to dissociate himself from the affections of the phenomenal world so as to pursue knowledge of eternal, unchanging, and invisible Forms.[218] This can be described as a process of allowing unstable beliefs that can hinder the mind from rationally performing its function and achieving its goals. In this case, many of these beliefs are refuted. It is encouraged that such refutations be seen as liberations that set the philosophic mind on path with no false beliefs.

This is where Argument from Hypothesis (AfH) becomes a tool. This practice is not possible without AfH. What it does essentially is to assist the philosophic mind in shaking off false beliefs that hinder the mind from ascending to *noesis*. This is in accordance with what Socrates tells Cebes that natural science is inadequate to satisfy the rational inquiry of getting to *noesis*.[219] This is the sense in which whatsoever that is considered to agree with that which is the soundest moves with it, for it is true. Essentially, AfH shakes off false beliefs, transient sensations and other hindrances that will cause a barrier for the philosophic mind to move up. Therefore, philosophic pretension of the mind, which is said to be the philosopher's practice of death, is possible by the AfH. This enables the mind to move up to *noesis*.

Proposed Knowledge Definition from the Lens of Argument from Hypothesis

Failure of the initial definitions of knowledge necessitates proposing another one. This is because it is believed that an attempt should be made to push further until an acceptable definition is, perhaps, gotten. In view of this,

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[217.] Plato, *Phaedo*, 65b-c
[218.] https://philosophicaleggs.com/106-the-practice-of-death accessed 24/10/2021
[219.] Plato, *Phaedo*, 96c

'knowledge is the intellectual apprehension of what is the case and infallible' is tentatively proposed as a new definition of knowledge.

It should be re-emphasized here that two forms of definition, which are formal and material, have been expounded. It was also noted that the definition is usually employed to unveil and elucidate for an adequate understanding of concepts and *pragmata*. If this holds, then it is adequate to say that a formal definition serves the purpose of elucidation and clarification of concepts better than its material counterpart that merely describes the constituents of what is to be defined. In this case, material definition will tend towards perceptible objects, which is usually not the purpose of definition.

It is necessary to go for a formal definition that will be useful even for different forms of knowledge. Again, the target is not a particular kind of knowledge but knowledge in general Hence, understanding knowledge assists in elucidating and clarifying its concepts. All forms of knowledge need a functional definition that will not be changed, altered, or modified. This implies that the formal definition will be the appropriate definition that is considered to work perfectly. In other words, the newly proposed definition appears to be all encompassing.

Knowledge definitions in *the Theaetetus* were rejected for some reasons, among which was that each of them failed to satisfy the criteria agreed upon by the interlocutors.[220] It should be asked whether this proposed definition will satisfy the criteria for it not to be rejected. Again, the criteria are that whatsoever is to be regarded as knowledge must 'always be what is' and 'infallible'. Here, knowledge definition is proposed as the apprehension of what is the case regarding the Forms. The proposed definition has some concepts that need to be understood; one of which is apprehension. Apprehension here is a rational accomplishment that does not require any serious intellectual activity. It is simply an understanding of what the case is. What is the case here is what is to be explained. What the case can be is anything that needs to be understood. The definition proposed will always be what it is because it is the understanding of that thing that is required. The definition is devoid of material explanation, thereby satisfying the two criteria. Apprehension of what is the case is not tied to any time or period. In addition, because it is not reliant on any material object, it is not fallible.

It is necessary to re-explain the Argument from Hypothesis (AfH) for clarity. It needs to be pointed out that its meaning will be given in relation to the essential function it performs. As adopted here, the Argument from Hypothesis (AfH), which is sometimes referred to as the hypothetical method, is a genuine and consistent mode of hypothesising the truest and surest proposition to confer justification on some other statements and

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[220.] Jessica Moss, *Plato's Epistemology: Being and Seeming*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2021, 56

determine whether these other statements are true or false. It can equally be described as a genuine and philosophical approach that is intellectually provided to examine premises so as to reach a secure hypothesis. This makes it a regulatory technique. This function is performed with the deployment of dialectics. Hence, it is a technique of laying down the theory adjudged to be the soundest, where whatever seems to agree with it is considered true, and moves on towards it, and whatever does not agree with it is considered false, and it drops off.

One basic feature of AfH is that it is all encompassing. It is referred to as the missing *logos*. While *logos* in the third definition has, among its meanings, reasoning, *logos* of AfH is reason; hence, being is referred to as missing *logos*. Reason here is pure contemplation that is not affected by sensible activities. It should be borne in mind that *logos* in the third definition was brought in with the intention of making a case for intelligible knowledge. However, its confusing nature is apparent; hence, it is inappropriate for the purpose meant. AfH as *logos* is not confusing, because it is of the intelligible world, a world of no confusion.

Argument from Hypothesis (AfH), as *logos*, has a unique feature, which is that it is a pure rational contemplation. It is devoid of transient sensible activity and not affected by phenomena of the visible world. It enables the philosophic mind form correct opinions which are in line with the hypothesised propositions. The true opinions are, thereafter, converted to knowledge by completely recollecting the forms in a dialectical inquiry.

AfH is considered a solution to the aporetic situation encountered in *Theaetetus*. It is deployed with intent, which is to solve the problem of the inability of the mind to ascend to *noesis*,[221] where acceptable knowledge is possibly found.[222] The method takes off its argument from a (hypothesised) proposition. These are sometimes considered self-evident. It serves as a foundation upon which whatsoever is to be decided is erected. It is equally considered standard. Whatever that cannot meet the standard is adjudged defective and discarded. Whatsoever that passes the test of the standard

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[221.] Details of the ascension are explained by Olúkáyòdé R. Adésuyì in his Ph.D Thesis. For details, see Olúkáyòdé R. Adésuyì, *Knowledge Definition in Plato's Theaetetus and the Argument from Hypothesis in the Phaedo*, (Unpublished) Ph.D Thesis, Written in the Department of Philosophy, Submitted to the Postgraduate College, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, 2023, 96-120

[222.] This is similar to the thesis of the Unitarians, and seems to be a correct interpretation of, for instance, Ronald H. McKinney, "The Origins of Modern Dialectics" *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Apr. - Jun., 1983), 179-190. His argument is simply that there is a connecting theme inherent in some of the dialogues of Plato. The Revisionists, however, appear to disagree with the Unitarians on this. Olúkáyòdé R. Adésuyì argues for the inappropriateness of the Revisionists concerning the Unitarian positions on Plato's dialogues. For details see his "Assessing the Revisionist Position on Knowledge Definition in Plato's *Theaetetus*" *FALSAFA Journal of Philosophy*, 4 (1), 2022: 108-127

moves up with the hypothesis. Hence, the hypothesis is basic. As described by Samuel Scolnicov

> The method argues from agreed premises, sometimes taken also as self-evident, to a conclusion; and, if the argument is accepted as valid, the acceptance of the premises is deemed to force the acceptance of the conclusion.[223]
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> To explain this, the issue raised in the dialogue is alluded to for proper understanding.
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> Knowledge must always be of what is; it must be infallible.[224]
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> 1. Theaetetus is knowledgeable.[225]
>
> How is this premise justified to ensure that it moves alongside the ladder, which is the hypothetical method? To do this, another premise that (1) above will align with will be supplied. Hence, premise (2). This same process is repeated until the hypothesised proposition is arrived at. Each premise questions itself to enable movement to the hypothesised.
>
> 2. Theaetetus is knowledgeable by the form of knowledge.
>
> (Does the form knowledge exist?) This leads to the next premise.
>
> 3. The form of knowledge exists.
>
> (How is this proven?)
>
> 4. The form of knowledge is one of the eternal verities.
>
> (Do the eternal verities exist?)
>
> 5. The eternal verities, of which knowledge is one, exist because the supreme form of goodness, which sheds truth on the form of knowledge (with infallible and what is), exists.
>
> Therefore, the form of knowledge exists as infallible and what exists.

In this case, the strength of the position taken depends on the strength of the agreed premises. This has been pointed out earlier regarding the two componental criteria, almost at the beginning of the *Theaetetus,* that an acceptable definition must be 'what is' and 'unerring (infallible)'. For such a definition to be achieved, the conditions have to be sought where they can possibly be got. This is not achievable in the sensible world. Such a method is sacred and important in seeking a definition of knowledge.

In the *Theaetetus*, there has been a series of intellectual activities to determine whether the definitions, so suggested, could qualify as a knowledge definition. In the process, each of the definitions is rejected for reasons that have been

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[223.] Samuel Scolnicov, "Love and the Method of Hypothesis" *Méthexis*, 5, 1992: 69

[224.] Plato, *Theaetetus*, 152c

[225.] Plato, *Theaetetus*, 144a; This is according to Theodorus when he describes Theaetetus. Hence, Socrates begins to ask questions. It is purposively adopted to draw home the point being made here.

expounded earlier. Again, an attempt has been made to interpret each of the definitions alongside the different stages of mental development in the allegory of the cave. On closer examination, the mind cannot move beyond the stage of *dianoia* except that it is intellectually aided. This is to enable the mind move higher to apprehend the cause of things at *noesis*. It is only going to apprehend because intellectual labour terminates at *dianoia*; there is no intellectual activity at *noesis*. What is present at *noesis* is the apprehension of the reality of the cause of things.

Note that at *dianoia*, the mind is in a dream state; hence, it relapses once again. Bearing in mind that *dianoia* is not its targeted final destination, it has to be aided for it to ascend to its final destination, where intellectual apprehension and grasp of the form of knowledge of what is the case and infallible is present. As it is impossible for the mind to move from *dianoia* to *noesis*, so it is impossible for the interlocutors to proceed beyond the third definition in the *Theaetetus*. Again, *logos* has been introduced, but it is not the appropriate *logos*. With the injection of Argument from Hypothesis (AfH) as provided for in Socrates' autobiographical passage, an appropriate *logos* is introduced.[226] An important tool to be deployed is dialectics, a stringent rational enquiry by which the philosophic mind questions its premises or hypotheses for apprehension of the reality of the Forms possible.[227]

To move beyond the stage of the third definition in the *Theaetetus*, the ladder of the hypothetical method is brought with the injection of dialectics. The missing *logos* that hinders knowledge is true belief with *logos* (an account) to transmute to knowledge is the hypothetical method. The method has the agency, which is the dialectics. It is intellectually equipped for the philosophic mind to appreciate propositions at *noesis*.

Although while the interlocutors, especially *Theaetetus*, could not move beyond the stage it has reached in *Theaetetus*, Plato anticipates its continuous search and eventual actualisation of getting a possible acceptable knowledge definition in the *Phaedo*, which is to be made possible through the Argument from Hypothesis (AfH) as contained in Socrates' autobiographical passage.[228] It is, therefore, suggested in this paper that an acceptable knowledge definition is 'knowledge is the intellectual apprehension of what is the case and infallible. This definition follows the hypothesised criteria of what any definition of knowledge will be. In addition, the definition equally deviates from sensory perceptual activities, which hinder the three suggested definitions in *Theaetetus*. This definition is independent of the sensible world and is aligned with the provisions of *noesis*.

[226.] Plato, *Phaedo*, 95c-99e
[227.] For a detailed understanding of Plato's dialectics, see Miriam Newton Byrd, "Dialectic and Plato's Method of Hypothesis" *Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science*, 40, (2), June, 2007: 141-158
[228.] Plato, *Phaedo*, 95c-99e

The above position is arrived at, given the contribution to the debate of the presence or otherwise of the theory of Forms in the *Theaetetus*.[229] At this point, an affirmative answer can be, and is, given. The link between the hypothetical method and the criteria agreed upon at the beginning of the discussion between Theaetetus and Socrates is becoming more evident. Looking at the salient position created by the criteria and the core of the hypothetical method, one can reasonably conclude that the criteria given in the Theaetetus are pointers to the method of hypothesis in the *Phaedo*. Looking at the two provisions, they share more similarities than differences (if there are any). This proves the presence of the theory of Forms in the *Theaetetus*, at least, if not fully present, one can say that it is hinted at. If asked the reason for the failure, it can reasonably be said that the criteria cannot be met in *Theaetetus*. There has to be necessarily a transcendental movement from the sensible world to the intelligible world where the apparatus can be found.

The hypothetical method is like a formula that guides the analysis of discourse. The formula is given, and it determines the truth or falsity of any claim. It accepts "what is in accordance with and rejects what is not."[230] This means any proposition that is deducible from this hypothesis or receives the logical support of the hypothetical method should be accepted as true. Any proposition, however, that is neither deducible nor does receive the support of the hypothetical method should be considered as false.

Another possible explanation, which should not be seen as a contradiction of the above analysis, but to further buttress its understanding, is that the criteria, 'what is' and 'infallibility', are not properties of the sensible world. It should be understood this way for the acceptable definition to be achieved. That they are not the properties of the sensible world implies that they do not give room for change but permanence (a basic feature of the Forms in the intelligible world). This implies that to get a definition that will satisfy these conditions, there must necessarily be a transcendental movement from the sensible world, where it is not achievable, to the intelligible world, where its achievement is possible. There has to be a paradigm shift from *Theaetetus*, in which acceptable answers could not be provided for the question asked.

Implications of the Proposed Definition on Gettier's JTB

One possible question and, in a way, objection that may arise is comparing *Theaetetus* with Edmund L. Gettier's critique of 'traditional' JTB.[231] In this regard, those objectors might think there is a need to explain how Gettier has possibly surpassed *Theaetetus*. What is maintained here, as it shall briefly but concisely be established, is that Gettier's analysis has not, in any way, gone beyond the level at which it was in *Theaetetus*. In the *Theaetetus,* it was

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[229.] Olúkáyòdé R. Adéṣuyì, "Assessing the Revisionist Position on Knowledge Definition in Plato's *Theaetetus*", 108-127
[230.] Palema M. Huby, "*Phaedo* 99D – 102A" *Phronesis*, 4 (1), 1959: 13
[231.] Edmund L. Gettier, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge" *Analysis,* 23 (6) 1963: 121-123

agreed among the interlocutors that knowledge is not perception; it is not true belief and it is not true belief with *logos* (an added account).[232] This means that even JTB was already envisaged and taken care of before its actual discussion among contemporary epistemologists. One wonders why Plato was dragged into the discussion again by Edmund L. Gettier.[233] Gettier should have realised that the discourse was with an *aporetic* ending. In a way, Gettier's work is, arguably, a replica of the discourse in *Theaetetus*. In other words, in spite of the distance in periods, both Gettier's JTB and Plato's work in *Theaetetus* are on the same level. At best, one can say that Gettier's JTB is an explanation of the rejection of the definitions in the *Theaetetus*.

It needs to be pointed out, however, that while the central theme of *Theaetetus* is the definition of an important concept – knowledge, the concern of Gettier is establishing a knowledge claim, which has been catered for alongside discussing the definitions of knowledge in *Theaetetus*. The two modes of justification, rational/logical and experiential/evidential modes, shown by Gettier[234] to have failed, have equally been demonstrated in *the Theaetetus* as not adequate for knowledge definition. Gettier has not, in any way, gone beyond that analysis. Whatsoever would have been said in Gettier's paper was already catered for in *the Theaetetus*. Hence, it is reasonable to argue that both *Theaetetus* and Gettier are on the same level. The newly proposed definition, therefore, is an attempt to remedy the inadequacy noted by both Plato in *Theaetetus* and Gettier.

Conclusion

'Knowledge is the intellectual apprehension of what is the case and infallible' has been proposed as a new but 'tentative' definition of knowledge. This proposal is cognisant of the criteria agreed upon by the interlocutors in *Theaetetus*.[235] This proposal is in line with the criteria. The criteria are replicas of the features of the form of knowledge in the intelligible world. Hence, the newly proposed definition is expected to satisfy, and it is strongly believed that it will satisfy the criteria (what is infallible). Intellectual apprehension of what is the case is a key component of the definition. The question is: does this component satisfy the criteria? A way to answer the question is to explain the component in the light of each of them. Apprehension means grasp or visualisation of what is the case. 'Grasp' can further be interpreted to mean having an unconfused understanding. Hence, what is on the ground is having an unconfused understanding of what is the case.

[232.] Plato, *Theaetetus*, 210b
[233.] Edmund L. Gettier, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge", 121
[234.] The two cases used as analogies to prove that the conditions of knowledge as justification, belief and truth are necessary but not sufficient fall within this. Both cases adopt both logical/rational and evidential/empirical modes of justification.
[235.] Plato, *Theaetetus*, 152c

'What is the case' is *general* in form. It represents that which is to be understood at a given time. It is not particular about a kind of knowledge. It is equally devoid of a sensible mode of explanation. It is a definition that is not a beneficiary of perceptual activities. Hence, it is strongly believed that the definition will overcome challenges encountered by the failed definitions in *Theaetetus*. This is because there will not be any reason to determine its acceptability on transient perceptual activities, which are contingent. Any definition that is contingent in nature cannot be 'what is'.

The definition equally passes other criteria, which is infallibility. This is so because it is not contingent. Formal definition is usually not fallible; what makes the other suggested definitions erroneous has already been taken care of. As a result, and that is the fact, this definition is devoid of perceptual activities that are themselves unceasingly changing. The new definition does not accommodate this. Unceasing change brings about error. Hence, the inability of such a definition to be affected by any change makes it possible for it to be error-free.

The two criteria are of the Forms. Forms of things remain eternally unchanging. With this, it, therefore, means the definition is attuned to the Forms. Again, it is devoid of material explanation and not reliant on any material object. So, it is hoped that the new definition would have proffered a solution to the age-old problem of the definition of knowledge.

The definition does not make use of sense experience. It is purely rational and abstract. Its application to a particular kind of knowledge can now appeal to sense experience. This equally makes the definition viable.

Argument from Hypothesis ([AfH] also known as hypothetical method), which is the missing *logos,* is expected to aid the newly proposed definition to be attuned to the forms from which the two criteria emanate. AfH neglects totally any form of hindrance that might make the AfH impossible to function as a ladder or roadmap to get to *noesis*, the stage of visualisation and grasp of what is. It will do this by what I refer to in this paper as philosophical pretention. It is proposed here, as well, that philosophical pretension aids the movement. This implies that in pursuing knowledge for the sake of it, philosophical pretention should guide to focus and not be distracted. This method encourages concentration. This is part of what AfH teaches.

This new definition can be accommodated by the Argument from Hypothesis (AfH), especially with the two criteria that serve as a standard for definition. This newly proposed definition is apparently accommodated by AfH, for the definition is able to move upward towards the criteria, such that the criteria confer justification on the definition, which enables it to be attuned with the form of knowledge.

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In conclusion, this new definition tries to eradicate what is termed 'division of linguistic labour'. This idea is borrowed from Hilary Putnam. It literally means that each person in a society has different jobs when it comes to words.[236] For this definition, it simply means the definition will be relevant irrespective of whether it is to be adopted among the rationalists or empiricists. It is, therefore, an apprehension of whatsoever that is to be discussed which falls within the purview of knowledge.

The definition equally sets standard that will not be too stringent. What this implies is that for what is the case to be apprehended should not be a difficult issue for anybody. There is no serious requirement for apprehension of what is to be known. Perhaps it is the inability to apprehend that brings about confusion. When there is a suitable explanatory model that does not require rigour, there will not be any confusion. In addition, the idea of fallibility would have been totally eradicated. It should be added that the means, which is AfH with dialectic, is stringent. It is not expected that the end be at the same level as the means.

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